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Abstract
We present a variant of a general equilibrium model with group formation to
study how changes of non-consumptive beneﬁts from group formation impact on
the well-being of group members. We identify a human relations paradox: Posi-
tive externalities increase, but none of the group members gains in equilibrium.
Moreover, a member who experiences an increase of positive emotional beneﬁts
in a group may become worse oﬀ in equilibrium.
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Finite economies ` a la Walras, Arrow and Debreu can exhibit paradoxical comparative
statics. For instance, if in a pure exchange economy, ceteris paribus a consumer’s en-
dowment bundle is increased whereas another consumer’s endowment is reduced by the
same amount, then in the ensuing competitive equilibrium the recipient of the positive
transfer may be worse oﬀ than in the equilibrium that would have resulted without the
transfer and the donor may be better oﬀ than without the transfer prior to competi-
tive exchange. Such a transfer paradox can be easily illustrated in an Edgeworth box
diagram. The paradox is usually discussed in the context of trade among countries.
Its plausibility has been debated and explored by Samuelson (1952, 1954) and many
authors before and after him.
In a similar vein, if ceteris paribus, a consumer’s endowment bundle in a pure ex-
change economy becomes larger, then as a consequence, the consumer’s equilibrium
welfare may be less. This phenomenon falls under the rubric of immiserizing growth in
international trade theory — which can also occur with respect to productivity gains.
The seminal contributions are by Bhagwati (1958, 1968). One can look at immiserizing
growth in reverse. Namely, suppose a consumer is worse oﬀ with a large endowment
than with a small one. Further suppose that the consumer starts out with a large
endowment. Then it would be to the consumer’s beneﬁt to destroy part of the en-
dowment prior to competitive exchange. This constitutes an instance of manipulation
via destruction of endowments or D-manipulability in the terminology of Postlewaite
(1979). In all three instances, a change of the initial endowment(s) has a drastic price
eﬀect: The terms of trade (relative prices) in the subsequent competitive exchange are
altered in a way that proves detrimental to the agent who is enriched prior to trade.
Here we perform comparative statics with respect to non-consumptive consumer
characteristics that aﬀect group decisions and consequently, through drastic price ef-
fects, aﬀect market outcomes. Typically, groups (for example households) form in
order to beneﬁt from group externalities. Group externalities capture all aspects of the
non-consumptive beneﬁts of humans living together. They can represent, for instance,
the emotional beneﬁt from living together with other persons in the same group.
In isolated groups an increase in the strength of group externalities will typically
beneﬁt all group members or at least one member. For instance, if one party has all
2the intra-group bargaining power, it can extract all the surplus from a relationship.
Consequently, if the surplus to be shared increases, that party should beneﬁt. We
show in the present note that this may not be the case if the group is embedded
in a society where groups form endogenously and trade in competitive markets for
consumption goods. In particular, we identify a human relations paradox where none
of the group members gains in equilibrium, although non-consumptive beneﬁts from
group formation increase.
2 The Setup
We use a simple variant of a general equilibrium model with group formation whose
general properties have been studied in Gersbach and Haller (2011). We consider a
population of three consumers, represented by I = {1,2,3}. Those consumers (agents,
individuals) can form groups. Groups are denoted by g or h. A group structure is a
partition of I and denoted by P,P 0 or P ∗. Speciﬁcally, P 0 = {{1},{2},{3}} describes
the group structure in which everybody is single. We will frequently focus on the group
structure P ∗ = {{1,2},{3}} in which the ﬁrst two individuals form a two-person group
and the third individual remains single.
There are two commodities, denoted k = 1,2. Preferences of an agent i ∈ I are
represented by a function of the form Ui(xi) + U
g




i (h) where xk
i
denotes the quantity of good k (k = 1,2) consumed by individual i. U
g
i (h) captures the
pure group externality contributing to the utility of individual i if he is a member
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(1)
The variables v1 and v2 stand for the extent of group externalities that individual 1
and 2 experience when they live together. Hence, only individuals 1 and 2 enjoy group
externalities. We further assume the individual endowments
w1 = (0,1/2),w2 = (0,1/2),w3 = (1,0).
33 Equilibria
We adopt the concept of eﬃcient budget set from Gersbach and Haller (2011). For a






















We further deﬁne the eﬃcient budget set EBh(p) as the set of (xi)i∈h ∈ Bh(p) with
the property that there is no (yi)i∈h ∈ Bh(p) such that
Ui(yi;h) ≥ Ui(xi;h) for all i ∈ h;
Ui(yi;h) > Ui(xi;h) for some i ∈ h.
For a singleton {i}, B{i}(p) = {xi ∈ R2
+ |pxi ≤ pwi} constitutes the standard budget
set and EB{i}(p) is the set of utility maximizers in i’s budget set. Moreover, let
V 0
i (p) = max{Ui(xi) : xi ∈ B{i}(p)} denote i’s indirect utility at the price system p.
We look at equilibria with free exit in the sense of Gersbach and Haller (2011).1
Such an equilibrium assumes the form (p;x;P) where (i) p = (p1,p2) is a price system,




i wi, (iii) P is a group
structure, and the following two conditions are satisﬁed:
(iv) collective rationality: (xi)i∈h ∈ EBh(p) for h ∈ P.
(v) individual rationality: Ui(xi) + U
g
i (h) ≥ V 0
i for i ∈ h ∈ P.
Condition (v) means that no group member has an incentive to exit and become a
single consumer.
To calculate such an equilibrium, we normalize the price of the ﬁrst commodity
to 1, i.e., p1 = 1. To prepare the derivation of the equilibrium, we ﬁrst look at
equilibria where everybody would be single and this group structure is treated as ﬁxed.
Given preferences and endowments, we obtain that there exists a unique competitive






0 = (1,1), x
0
1 = (1/2,0), x
0
2 = (0,1/2), x
0
3 = (1/2,1/2).
1We could also adopt the notion of an “equilibrium with free group formation” which allows
individuals to freely form new groups. In the present model, these two notions are equivalent as only
two individuals beneﬁt from forming groups.
4We next calculate particular competitive equilibria with free exit for the group struc-




where we assume that group g = {1,2} maximizes a utilitarian
social welfare function
Wg = αU1(x1) + (1 − α)U2(x2)
= αlnx
1
1 + (1 − α)lnx
2
2 + αlnv1 + (1 − α)lnv2,
subject to the budget constraint x1
1 + p2x2
2 = p2, where 0 < α < 1. The parameter
α can be interpreted as the weight of individual 1 in group g. Similarly, 1 − α is the
weight of individual 2. A solution of this problem produces an eﬃcient decision of
group g.
Since the group externalities do not aﬀect excess demand vectors of group g = {1,2},













A market equilibrium without exit considerations (p∗,x∗;P ∗) would require
p
∗ = (1,1/(2α)), x
∗
1 = (1/2,0), x
∗
2 = (0,1 − α), x
∗
3 = (1/2,α).
















which imply α ≥ 1
2v1 = α and α ≤ 1 − 1
2v2 = α. Hence, if α ∈ [α,α] = [ 1
2v1,1 − 1
2v2],
then (p∗,x∗,P ∗) is a competitive equilibrium with free exit.
It proves useful for our subsequent analysis to stress at this stage that the same
equilibrium with free exit can be obtained by focussing on Nash bargaining in group g.
For this purpose we denote by β and 1−β the relative bargaining power of individual
1 and 2, respectively. Furthermore, for i = 1,2, let x0
i(p2) denote individual i’s demand
as a single consumer at the price system (1,p2).







































on g’s budget set, given the relative bargaining power β and 1−β. Note that the group
g = {1,2} uses as conﬂict outcomes the outside options available at the price p2. The
outside option values V 0
i (1,p2) = Ui (x0
i(p2)) amount to ln(1
2p2) for individual 1 and to
ln(1
2) for the second individual. Using the group budget constraint x1
1 = p2 − p2x2
2, the












This is an implicit equation for x2
2. Now suppose the same allocation is obtained in a
competitive equilibrium with free exit where the group maximizes its utilitarian welfare
function, with respective weights α and 1 − α. Then we have x2
2 = 1 − α and thus
equation (2) is an implicit equation for β(α), the bargaining power of individual 1 that












Note that by deﬁnition of β(α), the weight α in Wg and the weight β = β(α) in Ng














Higher utilitarian power, that is, a higher weight in the group welfare function, trans-






for which the competitive equilibrium with free exit involving group g exists. The


















































4 The Human Relations Paradox
Conventional wisdom has it that if a party has all the bargaining power, it can extract
all the surplus from a relationship. Consequently, if the surplus increases, the party
should beneﬁt. This logic also applies here. If consumer 1 exerts total bargaining power,
β = 1, then he can extract all the surplus created by the group g = {1,2} up to the
point where consumer 2 is indiﬀerent between staying in the group and leaving. So let
us assume β = 1. Now suppose that v2, the amount of positive group externality which
consumer 1 exerts on consumer 2 increases, so that for whatever reasons consumer
2 derives more social or emotional beneﬁt from having consumer 1 around. Would
consumer 1 gain from such a change? Ceteris paribus, their total surplus would increase
and, by the above logic, consumer 1 would be the sole beneﬁciary. But it turns out
that neither consumer 1 nor 2 beneﬁts because the corresponding equilibrium prices
adjust. Indeed, we obtain:
Proposition 1 Suppose β ≡ 1. Then, an increase in positive group externalities v2
does not translate into higher utility for any member of group g = {1,2}.
proof. As β ≡ 1, we have α = α = 1 − 1
2v2. From equation (4) we observe that
equilibrium utility U1 = ln 1
2 +lnv1 is independent of α and thus an increase of v2 does
not aﬀect 1’s utility. For α = α, the second individual’s utility in equation (5) becomes
U2 = ln(1 − α) + ln 1
2 and thus is also independent of v2.
At a more intuitive level the upper bound α is increasing in v2. Therefore, the equi-
librium price p∗ = 1/(2α) declines in v2. Indiﬀerence of consumer 2 between staying
and leaving requires ln(x∗2
2 ) + lnv2 = ln(1/2) which amounts to x∗2
2 = 1/(2v2). As v2
increases, more of the group endowment with good 2 will be sold in exchange for good
1. But because of the decline of the equilibrium price p∗
2, consumer 1 cannot aﬀord
more than the previous consumption level x∗1
1 .
Hence, there is the paradoxical situation that an increase in positive group externalities
does not translate into higher utility for any of the group members. The only one to
7gain is consumer 3, whose equilibrium utility goes up.
Next let us consider the case of equal bargaining power, β ≡ 1/2, and v1 > 1,v2 > 1.
Then
β
1−β = 1 and by (3),
α
1 − α
[lnα + ln(2v1)] = ln(1 − α) + ln(2v2).
Moreover, α ∈ (α,α). If v1 increases, then α must decrease to preserve the equation.
As a result, consumers 1 and 2 both gain at the detriment of consumer 3. If v2
increases, then α must increase in order to preserve the equation. Hence consumer
3 gains, consumer 2 loses in terms of utility from consumption but gains in terms of
group externalities, and consumer 1 is unaﬀected by the increased group externality
— another paradoxical outcome.
In order to keep relative bargaining power constant when v1 or v2 changes, the corre-
sponding utilitarian weights have to adjust. In turn, equilibrium prices and equilibrium
welfare are aﬀected. The paradoxes occur because of a drastic price eﬀect in response
to preference changes. One might argue that in a large economy a small group can
only cause negligible price eﬀects and thus the paradox will not occur. However, a suf-
ﬁciently widespread change of consumer characteristics can have drastic price eﬀects
in a large economy as well. For instance, our conclusions immediately generalize to
the case of a replica economy where consumers 1, 2, and 3 are replaced by respective
consumer types 1, 2, 3 and there is the same number of consumers of each type.
To conclude, we have identiﬁed a human relations paradox which complements a
series of paradoxes that can occur in a market economy.
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